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research. The book is also well-written, 
clearly structured and engaging.
The first chapters explore the socio-
cultural distinctiveness of the people of 
the Cévennes within the wider Huguenot 
population. The Cévennes had converted 
massively to Calvinism in the early days 
of the Reformation, and its inhabitants 
remained uncompromising in their faith 
as the terms of the Edict of Nantes eroded 
in the second half of the seventeenth 
century (pp. 7-20). If the author passes 
too quickly, in my view, over the 
dragonnades, those military campaigns 
intended to convert local populations by 
force, the birth of an organized passive 
resistance in the early 1680s (pp. 21-63) 
provides an excellent background for the 
understanding of what would become 
the last French war of religion in the 
early eighteenth century. It retraces the 
formation of clandestine assemblies in the 
immediate aftermath of the Revocation 
of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, during 
Let God Arise is the first account of the 
last French war of religion written in 
English. The revolt of the Camisards in 
the Cévennes Mountains between 1702 
and 1710 has inspired a vast literature in 
France since the eighteenth century. Its 
compelling story of a peasant uprising 
fighting for the restoration of their 
freedom of religion was rapidly mythified 
into novels and operas in the nineteenth 
century; it inspired an award-winning 
film by René Allio in 1972 and continues 
to drive French historians to the present 
day. Despite the local scale of the conflict, 
its strategic importance and international 
resonance was in fact considerable in the 
wider context of the War of the Spanish 
Succession (1701-1714). An English 
contribution on the subject was therefore 
much needed and long overdue. Monahan 
could have relied on the existing and 
abundant French historiography, but, 
instead, and much to his credit, his 
account is largely based on new archival 
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the zeal of Basville, the king’s intendant 
in Languedoc. As the author shows, the 
repression was to a large extent managed 
locally, away from the absolutist rule of 
the Sun King (pp. 140-157). Versailles was 
not informed about the revolt until several 
months later and regarded it only as a 
temporary distraction in the midst of the 
War of the Spanish Succession (p. 115).
***
Monahan delivers a thorough and 
excellent account of the last French war 
of religion. Yet focusing on French 
primary sources only reveals one side of 
the story. The war of the Cévennes ought 
to be placed in the wider framework of 
European geopolitics, as it was at the 
time. Parallels were indeed made with 
the Protestant uprising led by Ferenc 
II Rákóczi against the Habsburgs in 
Hungary (1703-1711), and the historian 
Philippe Serisier’s work even revealed a 
degree of interaction between the two. 
If chapter nine discusses the Camisards’ 
connections with Protestant countries, 
established for the most part after 1685 
through the Huguenot diaspora, the role 
of the Anglo-Dutch coalition in particular 
remains underestimated by French 
historians to the present day. The war 
of the Cévennes was largely reported in 
the foreign press and debated in London 
coffee houses. Languedoc had maintained 
close ties with Protestant countries for a 
long time. Algernon Sidney, John Locke 
and Gilbert Burnet counted among the 
most famous English visitors to the 
region in the 1660s to 1680s, which no 
doubt influenced their views on religious 
toleration. The Glorious Revolution, as 
Monahan rightly points out (p. 34), had 
which charismatic lay prophets replaced 
those Huguenot ministers who had 
fled into exile abroad. Without their 
shepherds to guide them, the people of 
the Cévennes, or Cévenols, found relief 
in divine inspiration from the Holy Spirit 
and increasingly embraced martyrdom in 
response to their persecution.  
Women in particular played a prominent 
role in this passive resistance, teaching 
psalms and biblical passages to their children, 
who were forcefully converted by Catholic 
priests. These “mothers of the Camisard 
rebellion” (pp. 19-20) became charismatic 
prophetesses after the revocation (pp. 
55-56), and many would even die on the 
battlefield alongside their menfolk during 
the war of the Cévennes (pp. 91-93). By 
contrast, the silence of the local Protestant 
nobility proved conspicuous. Little was left 
of a Huguenot party since the Fronde; most 
nobles kept their distance from what was 
largely a revolt of young peasant-prophets 
(pp. 90-91). Those who did support them 
(among them, d’Aigaliers, d’Arzeliers, 
Miremont and Rochegude) only did so from 
abroad and rarely mentioned prophecy. 
The motivations behind the war of the 
Cévennes raise further questions about 
the rise of absolutism in late seventeenth-
century France. Drawing from French 
historians and in particular the work of 
Philippe Joutard, Monahan demonstrates 
that the Camisards did not take up arms 
for fiscal reasons, unlike the medieval 
jacqueries, but for the restoration of the 
Edict of Nantes (p. 83). Their rebellion is 
a case in point that political and religious 
dissent did not always go hand in hand, as 
it is too often assumed; for the Camisards 
always asserted their loyalty to Louis XIV 
and blamed instead their persecution on 
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the Dutch authorities remained more 
sympathetic and renewed their support 
to the rebels. The dramatic capture of the 
rebels Catinat and Ravanel (pp. 228-234) 
was likewise indirectly caused by the Allies’ 
support. Annoyed and frustrated that 
much of the money sent to the Cévennes 
did not seem to reach its destination, the 
Dutch government demanded receipts to 
be signed by all of the remaining Camisard 
leaders by 1705. The last standing chiefs, 
who from the beginning had waged a 
guerrilla war thanks to their coordinated 
attacks, were thus forced to meet in the 
same place to collect their funds, at which 
point they were betrayed, caught and 
executed. In addition, several competing 
plans elaborated by rival Huguenot 
diplomats and officers plagued the 
material support of foreign nations to the 
Cévennes throughout the conflict (pp. 
163-167). An English fleet finally landed in 
Sète in July 1710 and sought to revive the 
rebellion, but by that time the Camisards 
had been virtually exterminated. Their last 
charismatic leader, Abraham Mazel, was 
killed three months later.
Several questions remain unanswered 
about this tumultuous episode in French 
history, one of these being the existence 
of the Treaty of Nîmes, allegedly signed 
between Jean Cavalier and Marshall 
de Villars in May 1704. According to 
Cavalier’s memoirs, originally written 
in French around 1707, but published 
in English in 1726, the treaty restored 
the Edict of Nantes in Languedoc and 
constituted as a result a major victory for 
the Camisards. Monahan claims this treaty 
was invented by Cavalier as an excuse for 
his surrender (pp. 204-205). However, two 
copies of the treaty dated 11 May 1704 
a considerable impact in the Cévennes, 
perhaps more so than anywhere else 
outside of England, given its immediate 
proximity with the Principality of Orange, 
then a Protestant enclave in the heart of 
absolutist France. It was no coincidence 
that William III considered invading 
Languedoc with the support of the local 
population as early as 1689, nor that he 
supported François Vivens, the proto-
Camisard leader who first promoted an 
armed rebellion in the late 1680s (p. 42).
It was during the insurrection itself 
that the commitment of Protestant 
nations towards the Cévennes can 
be best assessed. The first reports of 
the insurrection appeared in foreign 
diplomatic correspondence earlier than 
what is acknowledged here (pp. 158-
162), virtually at the same time as they 
reached Versailles. The Anglo-Dutch 
coalition quickly realized the potential of 
supporting a civil war in France at a time 
when Louis XIV was fighting against 
the whole of Europe. Contrary to what 
Monahan and French historians claim 
(p. 182), foreign support did materialize 
and not only once, but on several 
occasions. A naval expedition reached 
the coast of Languedoc with weapons 
and ammunition in September 1703, but 
failed to establish contact with the rebels. 
The promise of imminent relief made by 
the Marquis de Miremont through his 
agent David Flotard was in fact kept, 
although the imprisonment of another 
agent, Tobie Rocayrol, a year later 
suggests that Flotard had never reached 
the Cévennes to fulfill his mission.
The Duke of Marlborough lost interest 
in the Cévennes after the failure of this 
expedition, but Anthonie Heinsius and 
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but the latter two bore a personal grudge 
against Cavalier at the time. However, 
the correspondence of the Princess 
Palatine confirms the existence of a secret 
interview with the king in Versailles and 
describes the young rebel as very bold. 
The circumstances of Cavalier’s departure 
from France require further examination, 
but he may well have achieved more than 
he has been credited for.
Let God Arise is an important book 
that will certainly be of interest to political 
and religious historians of the early 
modern period. It is in fact surprising that 
an English-language study of the war of 
the Cévennes did not see the light of day 
earlier, given its international significance 
at the time. In the end, Monahan ascribes 
the origins of the last French war of 
religion to “a failure to communicate” (p. 
253) between Protestants and Catholics, 
of course, but also between their Occitan 
dialect and French, between prophetic 
and regal discourse. To this must be 
added chronic miscommunication on 
either side, between the Camisards and 
the Allies, on the one hand, and between 
Montpellier and Versailles, on the other. 
The rebellion may have been over by 
1710, but it enabled the clandestine 
survival of Protestantism in France, 
while its prophetic spirit has survived 
abroad to the present day. Monahan’s 
study therefore fills a considerable 
historiographical gap that will no doubt 
inspire a future generation of scholars.
Lionel Laborie 
Goldsmiths, University of London
survive in archives in Leiden and London. 
They differ in their terms, but both grant 
freedom of religion in Languedoc and the 
release of all the prisoners and galley slaves 
since the revocation, and both bear the 
names of the main protagonists: Villars, 
Basville, La Lande, Cavalier and Billard. 
If it certainly was never implemented, the 
Treaty of Nîmes calls for further research. 
Similarly, the nature of Cavalier’s 
leadership has been much debated by 
historians. The author suggests that the 
Camisard leader renounced prophecy 
shortly before surrendering in 1704 as he 
negotiated his future military career (pp. 
207-208). While plausible, this was by no 
means a definite move. If Cavalier would 
subsequently repudiate the notorious 
French Prophets in London, as the author 
correctly points out (pp. 238-239), he was 
in reality the first one to acknowledge the 
prophetic nature of the revolt upon his 
arrival in Holland in 1706, much to the 
dismay of his audience. 
Cavalier’s departure from France has 
likewise been a historiographical bone of 
contention. Did the Camisard leader meet 
Louis XIV after his surrender? Monahan, 
like most French historians, answers in the 
negative (pp. 215-217). The official story 
goes that the Sun King refused to receive 
the embarrassing baker’s apprentice who 
had been defeating his troops for almost 
two years. Saint-Simon, Madame du 
Noyer and Voltaire claimed instead that 
Louis simply shrugged when he saw him, 
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